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Abstract
This chapter presents a survey of the theoretical literature on tax compe-
tition. Specifically, it reviews recent work on the effect of factor mobility
and the ensueing tax competition on the capacity of governments to raise
revenue and redistribute income. It focuses on three issues: the relevance
and limitations of the “raise against the bottom” result, the benefits and
pitfalls of partial coordination and the incidence of factors mobility on social
security systems.
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1 Introduction
One of the main alleged pitfalls of European construction is that it would
impede redistributive policies at the national level and threaten the future
of the “welfare state”. This allegation is widespread in political circles and
in the media and the recently decided addition of ten new member states is
likely to foster its intensity. A major theme in that debate is the potential
loss in tax revenues as a result of tax competition. Accordingly, the integra-
tion process would exert a negative influence on the ability of member states
to generate an “adequate” level of tax revenues. Over the last two decades,
this debate has spawned a significant amount of academic research and the
literature continues to grow at an impressive speed. While the underlying
problem involves a number of different ramifications, it seems that the lit-
erature has exploded in even more directions. The purpose of this chapter
is to provide a selective survey of this literature and to focus on some issues
that we consider as crucial for the future of redistributive policies and social
protection.1
Economic integration can affect redistribution in a variety of ways. In this
paper we focus on one of the implications of economic integration, namely
the increase in mobility of factors of production, of capital and labor. The
basic idea is that mobile factors can adjust their location to any interre-
gional differentials in taxation or in benefits. National governments cannot
abstract from such potential reaction when designing redistributive policies.
By focusing on factor mobility, we deliberately abstract from other implica-
tions of economic integration, such as increased mobility of goods, that can
also affect redistribution.
The literature on factor mobility and redistribution covers two aspects
of reality. Earlier work was based on the fiscal federalism literature and was
1There exists several surveys which focus on other aspects of that impressive litera-
ture. [see Wilson (1999), Haufler (2002), Wellich (2000), Wildasin (1994a), Cremer et al.
(1998)].
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exclusively devoted to the setting of a federal state. More recently, an in-
creasing number of studies have been concerned with economic unions, also
called confederations. The main difference between the two settings is that
there is a central authority in a federation while such a central government
typically does not exist in confederations.2 Consequently, the two settings
have different implications for the modelling of the relationship between re-
distribution and mobility. Our main concern being the redistributive capac-
ities of European Union national governments, we shall concentrate on the
case where no strong central government exists. However, our results also
apply to a federation with a sufficient degree of decentralization. Further-
more, we shall also discuss some transversal issues like the appropriateness
of centralization or cooperation and, in particular the potential benefits of
competition between national (or regional) governments.
We will first present our benchmark model of tax competition and its
implications as to reductions of tax rates and redistributive efforts; see Sec-
tion 2. We show that the “race to the bottom” result arises in a most
dramatic way in a small open economy setting. In such a framework, mobil-
ity and redistribution appear to be essentially incompatible. Mobility has a
less extreme impact in a strategic Nash equilibrium setting with a “limited”
number of countries: redistribution is adversely affected, but does not disap-
pear altogether. In Section 3 we then review the most evident qualifications
which pertain to assumptions made in the benchmark model. They con-
cern the assumption of symmetry, constant returns to scale technology, full
employment, benevolent governments and the political economy approach
instead of a normative one. In the following section, we deal with the issue
of tax cooperation and show its pitfalls. In particular, we study the issue of
partial cooperation policies, i.e., cooperation agreements which are limited
to a subset of the available tax instrument. A prominent example of such a
reform is currently under debate and consists in imposing a minimum tax
2Or, at least, has more limited prerogatives.
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on capital incomes. Finally, we consider the incidence of labor mobility on
social security schemes. This issue is likely to be of considerable importance
during the next decades. It goes beyond the scope of traditional tax com-
petition model in particular because it involves inter-generational (and thus
dynamic) issues. It has only recently started to received some attention in
the literature.
2 The benchmark model and the “race to the bot-
tom” result
2.1 Setting and closed economy solution
Consider a confederation of J identical countries, indexed j = 1, . . . , J . For
the sake of simplicity, we shall often concentrate on the case where J is large,
so that each individual country becomes (roughly speaking) a small open
economy. However, in some instances we allow for any level of J ≥ 2. Within
each country, competitive firms produce a single output using three factors of
production: capital, K, and two types of labor, e.g. skilled,M , and unskilled
L. Each country has a capital endowment of K and the number of native
skilled and unskilled workers is given by M and L respectively; each worker
supplies one unit of his type of labor. For the time being, we assume that
both capital and skilled labor are immobile while unskilled labor is mobile.
Consequently, we have K = K and M = M , but L can differ from L. We
thus distinguish the number of natives L from the number of residents L. In
other words, L−L is the net emigration if any. Once production takes place
the output is sold to residents as a final consumption. The consumption of
each type of worker is equal to his net of tax income and is denotes by cs
and cu for the skilled and unskilled respectively. Skilled workers own the
stock of capital; their income consists of earnings and capital income. The
objective of each national government is utilitarist over the population of
natives. National welfare it then given by:
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W =M u (cs) + L u (cu) (1)
Finally we have a constant returns to scale (CRS) production function
Y = F
¡
M,K,L
¢
. (2)
Using Euler’s law we can write:
Y = wsM + wuL+ r K, (3)
where r is the marginal productivity of capital and ws and wu denote the
marginal productivities of skilled workers and of unskilled workers respec-
tively. We assume that ws > wu is satisfied at the relevant solution.
Tax instruments consist of (positive or negative) per unit taxes on skilled
workers, τM , on unskilled workers τL and on capital τK . Assuming purely
redistributive taxation (with no revenue requirement) the budget constraint
of the government is given by:
τMM + τLL+ τKK = 0. (4)
With perfectly competitive markets, the gross return of each factor equals
its marginal product. Recalling that capital is owned by the skilled workers,
the net income and consumption levels of the two types of workers are then
given by:
cs = ws − τM +
¡
r − τK
¢
K/M, (5)
cu = wu − τL. (6)
Let us first of all consider the closed economy solution which is a useful
benchmark. To obtain this case, we impose L = L as additional constraint.
Using (1), (4), (5) and (6) we can then write the government’s problem as
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follows.
max
τK ,τM ,τL
M u
¡
ws − τM +
¡
r − τK
¢
K/M
¢
+ L u (wu − τu)
+ µ
£
τMM + τLL+ τKK
¤
.
The first-order conditions yield u0 (cs) = u0 (cu), which implies cs = cu. A
utilitarist national government would use the taxes to equate disposable
income or consumption. This extreme solution arises because all factors
are supplied inelastically and, for the time being, immobile. Consequently,
all tax instruments are effectively lump-sum. Note that we just need two
instruments. As long as τM is unrestricted we can set the tax on immobile
capital at any arbitrary level, including τK = r.3 In any case we will have
τL < 0, while the sign of τM is ambiguous. However, we know that the total
tax paid by skilled workers (including the capital tax) is positive.
2.2 Small open economy
Let us now open the economy and allow unskilled workers to move. Assum-
ing perfect mobility at no cost, their utility is then equated across countries.
Here equality of utility is equivalent to equality of disposable income. We
have thus:
cuj = ω ∀j.
In the small economy case (J → ∞) any individual country considers ω as
given and the problem for the government can thus be written as
max
τL
M u
Ã
F
¡
M,K,L
¢
− ωL
M
!
+ L u (ω) , (7)
where L = L
¡
ω + τL
¢
is the labor demand function.4 The specification of
this welfare function reflects the assumption that the social planner takes
3The results in this section would not change if K were dropped altogether. We have
nevertheless included it to make the model consisent with the specification used in Section
4.
4Which are derived in the usual way from profit maximization so that L solves
FL
¡
K,M,L
¢
= ω + τL.
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into account the welfare of its citizens before migration (the natives) and
not that of the final residents. We come back to this assumption in the
next section. It is not crucial but makes the exposition simpler. With this
specification, maximizing social welfare amounts to just maximizing Mcs =
F
¡
M,K,L
¢
− ωL. One easily checks the first order condition:
M
∂cs
∂τL
= (FL − ω)
∂L
∂wu
= τL
∂L
∂wu
which implies τL = 0.
In the small economy setting, mobility thus has a dramatic impact on
redistribution: we move from perfect income equalization achieved in the
closed economy to a no redistribution equilibrium when the economy is
open. This extreme conclusion is of course due to the specific assumptions
we have made. In particular, the idea that the national government takes
the mobile factor’s income as given is a bit extreme and can be qualified.
2.3 Strategic interaction: Nash equilibrium
To do so we shall now move away from the small open economy case and
consider a setting of strategic interaction with a “small” number of countries
(J < ∞). More precisely, we consider a (non-cooperative) game where the
players are the J countries and where the strategic variables are tax rates,
τLj . A country’s payoffs is welfare given by (1), where consumption levels are
evaluated at the migration equilibrium induced by the profile of tax rates.
We study the Nash-equilibrium of this game.
For any given profile of tax rates, mobility (and perfect competition in
the labor market) imply that the allocation of low skilled workers amongst
countries must satisfy:
JX
j=1
L
¡
ω + τLj
¢
= J L (8)
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where τLj are given and ω is endogenously determined.
5 Solving (8) yields ω
as a function of the profile of tax rates: ω = ω(τL1 , . . . , τ
L
J ). Differentiating
(8) yields
∂ω
∂τLj
= −
dL(ω + τLj )/dw
uP
k dL(ω + τ
L
k )/dw
u
. (9)
In a symmetric setting wherein τLj = τ
L for all j, this reduces to
∂ω(τL, . . . , τL)
∂τLj
= − 1
J
, (10)
and one has ∂ω/∂τLj = 0 (i.e., the small economy assumption) only for J
tending to infinity.
The payoff function of national government j is now obtained by substi-
tuting ω = ω(τL1 , . . . , τ
L
J ) into the objective function considered in expres-
sion (7), yielding :
M u
Ã
F
¡
M,K,Lj
¢
− ω(τL1 , . . . , τLJ )Lj
M
!
+L u
¡
ω(τL1 , . . . , τ
L
J )
¢
, (11)
where Lj = L[ω(τL1 , . . . , τ
L
J ) + τ
L
j ]. To determine country j’s best reply, we
maximize (11) with respect to τLj . The first order condition is given by:
u0 (cs) τLj
dLj
dwu
Ã
∂ω
∂τLj
+ 1
!
+ [Lu0 (cu)− Lju0 (cs)]
∂ω
∂τLj
= 0, (12)
and the Nash equilibrium is defined by the system of J identical equations
specified by (12), j = 1, . . . , J . Assuming a symmetric equilibrium with
τLj = τ
L (and thus Lj = L) for all j, making use of (10) and rearranging
yields the following characterization of the solution:6
τL
L
dL
dwu
µ
J − 1
J
¶
− 1
J
·
u0 (cu)− u0 (cs)
u0 (cs)
¸
= 0. (13)
5Each individual worker treats ω as given, but the countries now realize that a change
in taxes will affect ω.
6Existence of equilibria has been studied by Laussel and Le Breton (1998) and Bayindir-
Upmann and Ziad (2002).
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The first implication of (13) is that complete (cu = cs) or “excessive” redis-
tribution (cu > cs) cannot occur at a symmetric equilibrium. To see this,
observe that with cu ≥ cs, the term in brackets is negative so that with
dL/dwu < 0 we must have τL > 0, which in turn contradicts cu ≥ cs.7 Con-
sequently, the term in brackets is positive as cu < cs and (with finite J) we
obtain τL < 0 so that there is some redistribution. Regarding the other two
tax instruments, τM and τK , we have again one degree of freedom exactly
like in the closed economy case. With τL < 0 we know from the budget
constraint that the skilled have to pay a positive total tax. However, to levy
this total amount we need just one instrument and the other tax can be set
at any arbitrary level. When J tends to infinity, τL tends to 0 and we ob-
tain the small open economy as a limit case of this Nash equilibrium setting.
Similarly, when J “tends to 1”, we obtain the closed economy solution with
u0 (cu)− u0 (cs) as a “limit” case.8 Under some additional assumptions one
can also show that
¯¯
τL
¯¯
increases as J decreases. Put differently, the equilib-
rium transfer to the unskilled decreases as the number of countries increases.
Observe also that the elasticity (∂L/∂wu)(wu/L) plays a Ramsey-type role:
the higher it is (in absolute value), the lower will be the transfer.
To sum up, we have seen that in the case of a small economy (or at a
Nash equilibrium when J tends to infinity) there is a race to the bottom
and the bottom implies no tax and thus no redistribution at all. The race
is not that radical when the number of countries is reduced and there is
strategic interaction among countries. Nevertheless, the basic conjecture
that mobility puts downward pressure on redistribution goes through. We
have obtained this result in a setting where the unskilled and thus the ben-
eficiaries of redistribution are mobile. The same conclusion would however
emerge if instead the skilled (net tax payers) or capital were mobile.9
7Recall that wu < ws and that capital is owned by the skilled.
8This statement has of course to be qualified because J is a discrete variable in our
setting. The property we announce is based on taking the limit of the equilibrium condition
(13) while taking J as a continuous variable.
9Among the often cited papers which have discussed the race to bottom as resulting
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We shall now review a number of qualifications which have to be made to
assess the practical relevance of this result. Before proceeding, however, it is
important to stress that the downward pressure on redistribution does not
arise because of mobility per se. It arises first and foremost because of the
non-cooperative behavior of the countries. Like most of the tax competition
literature, we have considered a Nash equilibrium and it is well known that
Nash equilibria are typically not optimal. This problem can be overcome, at
least in principle, through cooperation. In Section (4) we come back to this
issue and show how to reach an optimal solution in an open economy through
cooperation. There we will also introduce two mobile factors (L and K),
thereby allowing for the possibility of “partial cooperation”.
3 Qualifications
Our benchmark model is highly stylized. It is solely meant to be illustrative
and to bring across the main points in the simplest possible way. To assess
its relevance and its policy implications a certain number of qualifications
pertaining to some of the basic assumptions are in order. We start with the
assumption of symmetry.
3.1 National asymmetries
In the benchmark model we have adopted an assumption of identical coun-
tries. It is clear that if we relax this assumption, the solution is likely to be
asymmetrical as well and this brings in the added complication that pro-
ductive efficiency can be violated (marginal products of mobile factors may
differ between countries). Furthermore, and most significantly from our per-
spective, under asymmetry it is no longer necessarily true that mobility leads
to less redistribution, at least not in all countries. To see this, consider a
two-country setting and assume that country 1 does not care about income
from factor mobility: Christiansen et al. (1994), Gordon (1983), Oates and Schwab (1988),
Lopez et al. (1998), Schjelderup (1997), Sinn (1990), Wildasin (1992,1997), Wilson (1980,
1982).
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inequality and thus maximizes total (or equivalently per capita) income of
its natives. Country 2, on the other hand, is averse to inequality (it has an
objective function similar to (1)). Except for this difference in preferences,
countries are identical. Both are concerned by the welfare of their native
citizens whether or not they move away. Further, we assume here that the
skilled workers are mobile whereas the unskilled are not. In this case, it
is clear that upon integration, country 2 will find it very difficult to redis-
tribute income and in any case, it will end up with less skilled workers than
it started with. In other words for this country redistribution decreases as
a result of mobility. However, country 1 may very well end up with more
redistribution that it would do in autarchy. To see this note that country 1
simply sets a zero tax under autarky. Under mobility, it will then tend to
“import” skilled workers. Consequently, it may find it interesting to impose
a positive tax on the skilled albeit for strategic reasons rather than for re-
distributive ones. This is because part of the taxed skilled are immigrants
who do not count in the welfare functions. Put differently, part of the tax
is exported and total revenue of the natives is maximized if the skilled are
taxed while proceeds are redistributed to the unskilled.
This type of “peculiar” outcome has been obtained by a number of au-
thors in different settings. Leite-Monteiro (1994), Wildasin (1994a & b) and
Epple and Romer (1991) all provide examples of cases where mobility can
induce one of the two regions to effect more redistribution that in autarky.
Asymmetry in objective functions is not the only one. There can also be
asymmetry in population size and also in capital endowment. Contributions
on that question are generally cast in a model of capital mobility. Bucovetsky
(1991) and Wilson (1991) both consider the case of countries that have
the same capital labor ratio but differ in population size. They show that
the less populated country enjoys a higher level of welfare following capital
integration. This is known as the small region advantage. Peralta and van
Ypersele (2002) obtain the same result in a setting when both population
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size and capital labor ratio are different at the start. They also show that
when the population is the same, a country with a smaller capital labor ratio
tends to loose from tax competition.
3.2 Objective function with varying population
When labor is mobile, one faces the problem of varying population size.
With endogenous population, measuring social welfare has always been a
controversial issue. Population economists are very familiar with the debate
between Mills and Bentham or, more specifically, between aiming at maxi-
mum total utility or at maximum per capita utility. With the former, there
is a bias towards favoring a population as large as possible; on the contrary,
with the latter there is a Malthusian bias. To circumvent this difficulty
several approaches have been used in the literature.
First of all, there is the approach used in the Tiebout tradition, wherein
the regional government — in fact a municipality — maximizes land value.
Alternatively, a number of authors have adopted a public choice view (me-
dian voter approach). Residents vote for the regional tax spending package.
Assuming that most people do not move, the majority is hardly concerned
with the welfare of the migrants — in or out — and if they are, this will be
out of altruism. Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991) have adopted
this view.
Another way to circumvent the difficulty raised by an endogenous pop-
ulation is to assume a mobility-free criterion such as citizenship. In our
benchmark model, we have assumed that national governments are exclu-
sively concerned by the welfare of the ”native citizens” whether or not they
stay in their region of origin. In that vein, Leite-Monteiro (1994) uses an
utilitarian social welfare function involving only the natives regardless of
location.
If we take u (·) as the utility function of either types of worker in country
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j, one can have two types of utilitarian social objectives:
W =M u (cs) + L u (cu) , (B)
like in our benchmark model, or alternatively
W =M u (cs) + L u (cu) , (M)
where the government cares about residents irrespective of their origin. Re-
call that L is the number of unskilled citizens (natives or initial residents)
and L that of unskilled workers (residents after mobility takes places). One
can easily show that those two objectives yield different solutions. When the
weight is endogenous as in (M) and migration is costless, the initial distri-
bution of the population across countries (i.e., the value of L) is irrelevant
and the solution tends to be closer to aggregate efficiency.
One clearly faces a rather difficult problem with objective (B). What
makes a nation is a dynamic and complex process. It takes years for new
immigrants to receive the same weight as long term residents in the political
process of a region. In that respect, Michel et al. (1998) consider an impor-
tant feature of countries with immigration, that is the progressive process of
adjustment and assimilation. In the beginning, newcomers have little, if any,
weight in the social welfare function. After some time (a decade or a gener-
ation), they become full fledged citizens; they can vote and have the same
weight as any other national. This specification offers the advantage of being
quite realistic and makes redistribution evolve over time, which is consistent
with what can be observed. In autarky one can have a lot of redistribution.
If the country opens to immigration of unskilled workers, the new migrants
have no weight at the beginning and this implies less redistribution. After a
while, when they become full fledged citizens, redistribution develops anew.
The possibility of differential tax treatment of immigrants makes a big
difference. This is essential to preserve the efficacy of redistributive poli-
cies that involve only nationals. In Western European countries, there is a
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significant immigration from outside of the economic union. Some of it is
illegal and of course there is considerable potential for much more. Those
immigrants do receive unequal treatment compared with those from the Eu-
ropean Union area, and this is specially true for illegal ones. Indeed, the
denial of fiscal and social benefits to illegal migrants seems to be part of a
deliberate employment policy.
This is not an abstract issue. The Scientific Council of the German Min-
istry of Finance has recently proposed to replace the traditional employ-
ment principle with a ”delayed” integration principle in the assignment of
individuals to jurisdictions in terms of taxation, social insurance and social
assistance in Europe.10
Moving from the employment principle to the origin principle implies
that individuals are taxed and received benefits in their home country. It
has obvious efficiency advantages and safeguards the welfare state. It has
also serious disadvantages; in particular, it is much harder to enforce and it
raises ethical problems.
3.3 Benevolent governments
The tax competition literature generally assume national governments that
are benevolent maximizers of social welfare. At times it assumes decision
making based on majority voting in which case the median voter essentially
“becomes” the social planner.11 In either case what matters are the prefer-
ences of citizen or residents and national authorities always choose a Pareto-
efficient outcome (from their perspective and conditional on the behavior of
other countries). In such a world, tax competition tends of course to be a
bad thing for it imposes additional constraints on otherwise welfare maxi-
mizing authorities. Mobility in itself may of course be efficiency enhancing,
10See Richter (2001) and Sinn (1994).
11The classical paper on this is Epple and Romer (1991). More recently Hindriks (2001)
analyzes also a model with imperfect mobility of the poor and the rich and with redistri-
bution chosen by majority. He shows that greater mobility of the poor can increase the
extent of redistribution.
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but the lack of cooperation between national tax policies unavoidably tends
to lower welfare.
The public choice literature, in contrast, has a radically different per-
ception of how the policy making process works. In particular, Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) suggest that governments generally lack accountability,
especially higher levels of government. Therefore, there is room for policy
makers to pursue their own personal goals, rather than serving the interest
of the public. The personal interest of policy makers will typically result in
too high levels of public expenditures. To account for the possibility of non
benevolent behavior on behalf of public authorities, public choice economists
often assume a Leviathan-type government that is an untrustworthy revenue
maximizer. Accordingly, governments have the tendency to set tax rates that
are too high from a social point of view. In that case, tax competition will
serve the valuable task of taming the Leviathan. In particular, it forces gov-
ernments to reduce taxes, which improves the conditions for an efficient mix
of taxes and public expenditures (McLure, 1986).
Edwards and Keen (1996) try to reconcile the two opposing views on
governments. They develop a model of tax competition where the govern-
ment is characterized by properties of both the benevolent maximizer of
social welfare and the Leviathan revenue maximizer. Consequently, the cost
of tax competition related to fiscal externalities should be weighed in the
Edwards-Keen model against the gains of tax competition associated with
the disciplining impact on the Leviathan. Within their setting Edwards and
Keen derive an explicit condition regarding government behavior the under
which tax competition harms social welfare. In particular, welfare increases
only if the fraction of government spending that represents ”pure waste” ex-
ceeds the responsiveness of the mobile factor (capital in their case) to taxes.
Hence, if capital is very elastic, tax competition is unlikely to be beneficial
for this would require a very high fraction of the Leviathan-component of
15
public spending.12
3.4 Constant returns to scale
The tax competition literature usually starts from the assumption that tech-
nology has constant returns to scale. As a consequence one ends up with
interior solutions and avoids the unpleasant outcome of empty communities
or depopulated countries. In the two factor case, one mobile and one immo-
bile, it is clear that with constant returns to scale production function one
cannot have all mobile factors flowing into a single country. Their marginal
productivity would vanish relative to what it is in the other countries.
There is however an increasing awareness that in both national and
supranational area there are such things as core regions, heavily populated
and technically very modern, and peripheral regions, retaining only tradi-
tional and local activities and being progressively depopulated. The question
is then raised of whether such an outcome is socially desirable and if not,
how to correct it.
To account for interregional disparities, economist geographers depart
from the neoclassical world of constant returns to scale and perfect com-
petition in which economic integration does neither amplify nor dampen
geographical discrepancies. With increasing returns to scale and imperfect
competition, labor mobility generates the emergence of modern and tradi-
tional sectors. Unskilled workers are assumed to be much less mobile than
skilled workers. The latter will move to the modern sector where they pro-
duced a differentiated good which is monopolistically competitive and costly
traded.
In these models mobility and transport costs are introduced and play an
important role. For example, Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) have a model in
which the market outcome is socially desirable when transport costs are ei-
12 In the same line, see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Kelders and Kölhenbürger
(2003) who argue that tax competition does not necessarily imply undertaxation in federal
systems with tax incentives arrangements.
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ther high or low. In the first case, activities are dispersed and this is efficient.
In the second case, they are agglomerated and again this is efficient. In con-
trast, with intermediary transport costs, the market leads to a polarization
between modern and traditional sectors whereas optimality recommends a
balanced allocation of activities.
3.5 Full employment
In tax competition literature, full employment is generally assumed and
redistribution is typically epitomized by income tax-transfer schemes and,
more rarely, by social insurance schemes. This is somewhat surprising as
there is a huge debate in political circles on the issue of attracting for-
eign investment to boost domestic employment and on the robustness of
social insurance schemes to tax competition. More specifically, the belief is
widespread that fostering employment through wage subsidies and provid-
ing unemployed with generous compensations are conflicting objectives in a
setting of factor mobility and tax competition.
There exists some papers trying to integrate unemployment in tax com-
petition models. They typically focus on capital mobility. Lejour and Ver-
bon (1994, 1996), for instance, develop a two-country model where wages a
determined through a union-firm bargaining process, and where capital is
imperfectly mobile across countries. A payroll tax is levied to finance an
unemployment benefit. The government chooses the payroll tax which in
turn determines the unemployment benefits, so as to maximize a weighted
sum of the utility of workers and capital owners. Their setting relies on
a number of specific assumption. In particular, it assumes, that the wage
elasticity of labor demand is larger than one. Lejour and Verbon show that
opening borders to capital reduces the payroll tax and that, with mobile
capital, a coordinated rise in the countries’ payroll tax would increase the
countries’ weighted sum of individual utilities.
In a more recent paper, Fuest and Huber (1999b) also assume that wages
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are subject to union-firm bargaining. However, contrary to Lejour and Ver-
bon (1996) individuals’ labor supply is elastic. Accordingly the wage bar-
gaining process results in all individuals being employed but rationed in
their labor supply (underemployment). In each country a wage tax and a
source-based capital tax are used along with a 100% profit tax to finance the
provision of a public good rather that an unemployment benefit. Taking into
account the mobility of capital across countries, each country’s government
chooses its fiscal instruments so as to maximize the utility of its represen-
tative citizen. Huber and Fuest show that if governments do not account
for the effects of their policy on the wage bargaining process, a coordinated
increase in either the wage tax or the capital tax (the other tax being kept
constant) results in a reduction of welfare. However, if they account for the
effect of their policy, the result is shown to depend upon the wage elasticity
of labor demand; the cooperation measures considered above lead to a fall in
welfare if this elasticity is smaller than one and to a rise in welfare otherwise.
Lozachmeur (2001) develops a model in the vein of Harris and Todaro in
which there is unemployment and potential migrants equate their expected
utility across countries. Mobility and fiscal competition lead to underpro-
vision of unemployment benefits. Using a common framework of analysis,
Richter and Schneider (2001) and Koskela and Schöb (2000) show that the
optimal tax on mobile capital need not be zero if there are distortions in
the labor market. This conclusion holds under both unemployment and un-
deremployment. In particular they show that, if wages are the result of
bargaining between unions and firms, the tax on capital depends not only
on the properties of the production function but also on the restrictions on
other fiscal instruments, such as profit and wage taxes.
The issue of fiscal competition with distorted labor markets has also
been investigated by Gabszewicz and van Ypersele (1996). They develop a
political economics model where some minimal wage is chosen by majority
voting and results in unemployment. They show that opening borders to
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capital flows has a depressing effect on the minimal wage.
Finally, Leite Monteiro et al. (2002) analyze how capital income taxation
can be used to fight structural unemployment. In a model that generalizes
Lejour and Verbon (1996) they consider a setting of wage bargaining, where
each country has to decide on employment-enhancing policies and on re-
distributive policies aimed at the unemployed. Contrary to the case where
wages are exogenously given, the chosen level of employment subsidy may
be lower with capital mobility. This result, which seems counter-intuitive, is
explained by the fact that unions do not fully account for all the effects of
their wage choice on the expected utility of their members. In particular,
the change in the interest rate induced by the choice of the union’s wage
affects the elasticity of labor demand. The choice of the country’s employ-
ment subsidy in a closed economy setting will then account for this myopic
behavior of unions. Opening the borders to capital flows may then lower the
employment subsidy.
4 Tax competition and tax cooperation
We have seen that under mobility, net factor returns are linked so that the
redistribution of income becomes a public good the benefits of which extend
to the enlarged factor market itself. From there, a number of authors start-
ing with Stigler (1957), view redistribution as a responsibility of the central
(federal) government. Accordingly, grants from the central government to
lower-level governments, or preferably direct taxation of households by the
central government, can be used to internalize the fiscal externalities asso-
ciated with income redistribution and, hence, to achieve a more satisfactory
outcome.
In terms of our benchmark model, full redistribution can be achieved
by entrusting the central government with the appropriate tax instruments.
The proposition that central governments should take primacy in equity
aspects of tax polity, and be assigned the tax bases that are mobile at lower
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levels, is directly inspired by the theory of fiscal federalism. It clearly calls
for several qualifications particularly when applied to an economic union
without powerful central authority rather that to a standard federal state.
As a matter of fact, the centralization of the redistributive functions
has been questioned even in the fiscal federalism setting where a central
government does exist, in particular on informational grounds. It raises
further objections in a confederate setting without any central authority. The
relevant issue then become one of cooperation to overcome the inefficiencies
created by non-cooperative behavior.
We have already mentioned in Section 2 that a globally first-best opti-
mal outcome can be reestablished through “full cooperation” on all relevant
policy instruments. This is of course a somewhat naive view for it neglects
the problem of enforceability of cooperation agreements as well as possible
informational problems.13 Another limitation of this results is that in real-
ity an across the board cooperation on all relevant tax instruments may be
quite difficult to achieve. A piece-meal approach involving only partial co-
operation (or harmonization) appears to be more reasonable to expect. But
then the welfare impact of the cooperation policy is less straightforward to
assess. For instance if the EU countries were to agree on minimum tax rates
on capital incomes, this might lead to fiercer tax competition for the setting
of other tax instruments.
The potential pitfalls of partial cooperation were first discussed by Cre-
mer and Gahvari (2000) in a setting with a single tax but with the possi-
bility of tax evasion. These authors have shown that the harmonization of
statutory tax rates, may induce countries to cut down on enforcement poli-
cies, thereby reintroducing tax competition through the back-door. More
recently, the same authors have a setting of tax competition with two in-
struments in the context of environmental taxation; see Cremer and Gahvari
13An alternative suggested by Cardarelli et al. (2002) is to adopt a repeated games
setting. They show that under some assumptions full efficiency can be achieved.
20
(2002a—2002b). They show that when countries agree on minimum taxes on
polluting (final) goods, tax competition may be shifted to emission taxes
(collected at the production level).
To address the issue of tax cooperation in particular that of partial coop-
eration, we will now slightly complicate our canonical model. This brings us
close to the specification recently used by Marchand et al. (2002) by which
our analysis in this section is inspired. To make room for tax competition
on more than one instrument, we now consider two mobile factors: capital
and unskilled workers. We show that tax competition along with the small
open economy assumption leads to a zero tax on both mobile factors. With
tax cooperation this can be avoided. Then we show that partial cooperation
can be harmful.14 Finally, we discuss some other issue of tax cooperation.
4.1 Tax competition and tax cooperation with two mobile
factors
We consider the benchmark model with a large number identical countries
j = 1, ..., J . To reflect the assumption that capital K, is now mobile, along
with unskilled labor, L, the CRS production function (2) is rewritten as:
Yj = F
¡
M j ,Kj , Lj
¢
,
The country index j which so far was dropped for simplicity will be system-
atically used in this section to avoid confusions. Since M is immobile and
identical across countries, one can normalize to 1 and write:
Yj = F (1,Kj , Lj) . (14)
where the earnings of skilled labor is:
F jM = Yj −Kj F
j
K − Lj F
j
L (15)
14See also Fuest (1995) and Fuest and Huber (1999a).
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The (initial) capital stock K continues to be held by the skilled, it is iden-
tical in all countries. Similarly, the number of native unskilled is N in all
countries. As seen in Section 2, without mobility we have full redistribution
with cs = cu.
Perfect mobility of factors L and K implies that their net returns are
equated across countries. Namely
F jK − τ
K
j = %, j = 1, ..., J (16)
and
F jL − τ
L
j = ω, j = 1, ..., J. (17)
where % and ω denote the net interest rate and net wage respectively in the
world markets. This implies the following factor demands:
Kj = Kj
¡
%+ τKj ,ω + τ
L
j
¢
(18)
and
Lj = Lj
¡
%+ τKj ,ω + τ
L
j
¢
. (19)
We distinguish in each country the initial endowments of factors, denoted
by K and L, that are the same across countries and the actual levels of
factors used, denoted by Kj and Lj . At the equilibrium of the world factor
markets, we must have the following equalities:
X
j
Kj
¡
%+ τKj ,ω + τ
L
j
¢
= JK (20)
and
X
j
Lj
¡
%+ τKj ,ω + τ
L
j
¢
= JL. (21)
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Since countries are identical, the following properties hold at the symmetric
equilibrium:15
∂ω
∂τLj
= − 1
J
∂%
∂τKj
= − 1
J
,
which generalizes (10). When J tends to infinity,
∂ω
∂τKj
=
∂%
∂τLj
= 0
so that ω and % are taken as given by each country. This is once again the
small economy case on which we concentrate for the rest of this section.
We now turn to the implication of factor mobility on the redistributive
tax policy. Each national government maximizes:
Wj = u
¡
csj
¢
+ L u (ω) .
>From each country’s perspective maximizing Wj amounts to maximizing
csj :
csj = Fj − %Kj − ω Lj + % K. (22)
This yields the following first-order conditions:
∂csj
∂τKj
= τKj
∂Kj
∂τKj
+ τLj
∂Lj
∂τKj
= 0, (23a)
∂csj
∂τLj
= τKj
∂Kj
∂τLj
+ τLj
∂Lj
∂τLj
= 0. (23b)
Since % and ω are taken as given the effect of a change in τKj on either Kj or
Lj is the same as the effect of a change in rj ≡ %+ τKj and the same holds
15To show this, let us first totally differentiate the optimality conditions (16) and (17).
It yields: Kjr ≡ ∂Kj/∂rj = S−1j F
j
LL(1,Kj ;Lj), L
j
w = S
−1
j F
j
KK(·) and Kjw = Ljr =
−S−1j F
j
KL(·), where Sj = F jKK(·)F jLL(·)− (F jKL(·))2 > 0. In order to determine d%/dτKj
and dω/dτKj , we then differentiate (20)and(21) with respect to %,ω and τKj , which givesP
iK
i
rd% +
P
iK
i
wdω = −KjrdτKj and
P
i L
i
rd% +
P
i L
i
wdω = −LjrdτKj . Solving this
system of two equations yields d%/dτKj = −1/J and dω/dτKj = 0 at the symmetric equi-
librium where Kj = K and Lj = L, j = 1, · · · , J . The other derivatives, ∂%/∂τLj = 0 and
∂ω/∂τLj = −1/J , are obtained in the same way.
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for τLj with wj ≡ ω + τLj . We can thus rewrite:
∂csj
∂τKj
= τKj K
j
r + τ
L
j L
j
r = 0, (24a)
∂csj
∂τLj
= τKj K
j
w + τ
L
j L
j
w = 0. (24b)
where the partial derivatives Kjr , L
j
r,K
j
w, L
j
w are derived in footnote 15 and
are given by:
Kjr ≡
∂Kj
∂rj
=
FLL
¡
1,K,L
¢
S
; Ljw ≡
∂Lj
∂wj
=
FKK
¡
1,K,L
¢
S
, (25)
Kjw =
∂Kj
∂wj
≡ Ljr =
∂Lj
∂rj
=
−FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
S
, (26)
with S = FKK(1,K,L)FLL(1,K,L) − F 2KL(1,K,L) > 0. Note for future
reference that at the symmetric equilibrium the derivatives of the demand
functions for Kj and Lj in (23a) and (23b) are identical across countries and
only depend upon K and L.
With S > 0, the solution to (24a)—(24a) is given by τKj = τ
L
j = 0. In the
small open economy setting adopted here where the world prices of mobile
factors are taken as given by each country, redistributive taxes and subsidies
are equal to zero.
This solution is to be contrasted with that obtained in autarky. It is
also to be compared with that obtained in a cooperative framework in which
national governments agree on (and commit to) a policy which maximizes
the utility of a representative country. In our setting of identical countries,
this cooperative solution would be the same as the autarchic one, that is, it
would imply equal disposable income for the two types of individuals within
and across countries; see Section 2. Observe that to achieve this solution,
the agreement must concern all tax instruments, or, to be more precise as
many tax instruments as there are degrees of freedom. In our setting this
would require for instance a uniform subsidy
¡
−τL
¢
on earnings and a tax on
capital income
¡
τK
¢
that would be set so as to equate disposable incomes.16
16Recall that there is a third instrument, namely τM which is determined as residual
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For a number of reasons pertaining mainly to political economy, it is
often difficult to find an agreement on all tax instruments. At best, one
can expect that there will be an agreement around what is the most shock-
ing consequence of tax competition, the fact that some ”symbolic” sources
of income, typically capital, fully escape taxation.17 To account for this
difficulty, we shall now study partial cooperation measure. In particular,
study the implications of agreement on a certain level (strictly positive)
of taxation of capital, while the other tax instruments continue to be set
non-cooperatively.
4.2 Partial tax cooperation
Starting from the laissez-faire situation we thus now turn to the case where
only some partial cooperation is possible. We consider the implications
of a coordinated increase in τKj to a “minimum rate”, denoted bτK > 0,
while the other tax τLj is free to vary the way the countries decide. Let be
this minimum rate that all countries are forced to apply. This means that
condition (24b) remains relevant and determines each countries choice of τLj :
bτK Kjw + τLj Ljw = 0 (27)
while equation (24a) relative to the choice of τKj does not hold anymore.
Consequently, the equilibrium level of τLj is now conditional on bτK , the
tax rate on capital. Under symmetry this level is obtained from a single
equation, namely (27). Furthermore, in this equation Kjw and L
j
w are effec-
tively constants; see equations (25) and (26). This is because as long as the
equilibrium remains symmetric, each country uses K units of capital and L
unskilled workers.18 This simplifies the analysis considerably.
to achieve budged balance. While this third instrument does not explicitly appear in our
analysis, its availability is accounted for in the expressions. In particular it ensure that
there are effectively two degrees of freedom so that the study of partial coordination is
meaningful in the first place.
17See on this Huizinga (1995).
18Put differently, while the possibility of factor mobility has a dramatic impact on tax
rates, there will be no effective mobility at the symmetric equilibrium.
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To determine the effect of a small coordinated increase in bτK on τLj , we
totally differentiate (27) with respect to the tax rates:
KjwdbτK + LjwdτLj = 0.
which yields:
dτLj
dbτK = −K
j
w
Ljw
=
FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
FKK
¡
1,K,L
¢ (28)
Consequently, and with FKK < 0, dτLj /dbτK has the opposite sign of
FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
. Also recall that in the small open economy case we start
from τLj = 0. Consequently, when capital and low skilled labor are comple-
ments (FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
> 0) imposing a positive tax on capital will result in
a negative tax (a subsidy) on the low skilled. This appears to be a move
in the right direction for it brings us closer to the optimum. On the other
hand when the two factors are substitutes (FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
< 0), we will have
τLj > 0 so that the low skilled now pay taxes which will benefit the high
skilled. In other words we have a case of reverse redistribution. This suggests
that the cooperation on the capital tax can be expected to have a positive
impact on welfare only in the case where lower skilled labor and capital are
substitutes. When they are complements, the cooperation appears to have
perverse effects on redistribution.
To confirm this, let us study the impact on consumption levels and on
welfare. Recall that the consumption of unskilled workers is cuj = ω so
that the consumption of the skilled workers (and capital owners) is given by
csj = F
¡
1,K,L
¢
−Lω. Using (17) along with the property that F jL does not
change we obtain
dcuj
dbτK = − dτ
L
j
dbτK = − FKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
FKK
¡
1,K,L
¢ (29)
and
dcsj
dbτK = L dτ
L
j
dbτK = LFKL
¡
1,K,L
¢
FKK
¡
1,K,L
¢ . (30)
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To understand these expressions it is important to realize that while each
country considers ω as constant (and independent of the policy decisions
of a single country), the net wage ω does change following the increase in
capital taxation (which applies to all countries). This is brought out clearly
by expression (17).
Turning to social welfare we then obtain:
dWj
dbτK = Lu0 ¡cuj ¢ dc
u
j
dbτK + u0 ¡csj¢ dc
s
j
dbτK ,
= L
£
u0
¡
csj
¢
− u0
¡
cuj
¢¤ FKL(1,K,L)
FKK(1,K,L)
.
By assumption we have in the laissez-faire with no tax csj > c
u
j and thus
u0
³
csj
´
< u0
³
cuj
´
. When moving away from that situation by increasing
marginally τK in a coordinated way (dbτK > 0) we conclude that
dWj ≶ 0, dcuj ≶ 0 and dcsj ≷ 0 if FKL(1,K,L) ≶ 0.
This confirms our conjecture made above. In particular, when
FKL(1,K,L) < 0, namely when the two mobile factors are substitutes,
a minimum tax on capital income proves to be welfare decreasing. With
complements, on the other hand welfare increases.
The understand the intuition behind these results we have to return to
the impact of capital tax harmonization on τLj as shown by (28). The bot-
tom line is than when the two mobile factors are complements, reducing
tax competition on one of the taxes creates a spillover for the other tax
as it also relaxes tax competition there. To be more precise, when bτK is
increased (above the Nash equilibrium level) each country would like to uni-
lateraly decrease the tax on capital and thus to increase the net return of
this factor. This can be achieved indirectly by subsidizing the complemen-
tary factor namely unskilled labor. With substitutes, on the other hand,
we get the opposite effect: the cooperation juts shifts the tax competition
from one instrument to the other. Each individual country will now be
tempted to indirectly increase the return on capital by increasing the tax
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on the substitute (unskilled labor). Consequently countries compete in an-
other tax instrument instead and the overall outcome is worse than the
laissez-faire.19
4.3 Centralization and/or coordination: further discussion
We have pointed out in section 3.3 that tax competition may be welfare
improving when governments are not benevolent. When this is the case, co-
ordination will of course not have a positive impact on welfare. To conclude
our review of the issue of coordination, we shall now sketch a few additional
potential pitfalls to coordination and/or centralization. The issues we re-
view arise because of informational problems. First, we shall contrast the
tax competition litterature with the Tiebout hypothesis under which mo-
bility (and competition between local governments) plays an important role
for preference revelation. Second, we shall discuss Pauly’s application of the
Tiebout model to the context of redistributions. In these two settings the
underlying information failure is that individual preferences (willingness to
pay) for public goods (or redistribution) are not observable. Our third and
last point is based on a different type of information asymmetry, namely
that between central and local authorities. Consequently, redistribution be-
tween regions or countries by a central (supra-national) authoritiy may be
problematic, even when policy makers are benevolent.
4.3.1 Fiscal federalism versus Tiebout hypothesis
By assuming at the outset that regions consist of heterogenous individuals,
the theory of fiscal federalism brings a bias towards the centralization of the
redistributive functions. One could assume instead that people freely move
across regions looking for the pattern of taxes and services filling their tastes
and their income. Such a process by which mobility alone would be enough
19The interpretation is complicated by the fact that one factor (capital) should be taxed,
while the other one (unskilled labor) should be subsidized. Reinforced tax competition
then translates into a higher tax (lower subsidy) on unskilled labor (which each country
would like to “repel”).
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to secure efficiency in patterns of local public expenditure and taxation is
known as the Tiebout hypothesis. Under some assumptions, it does not only
imply efficiency but also homogeneity of communities.
If the Tiebout hypothesis were verified, it would mean that the main
question of this paper, that is of the efficacy of redistributive policies within
regions being challenged by fiscal competition would appear groundless.
There would be no need for redistribution at the regional level if before
tax income were equalized by mobility. Yet, there is another issue which is
that of redistribution across regions. Such redistribution calls for a central
authority. Coming back to Tiebout’s hypothesis and without engaging a
long and intricate debate, it suffices to note that it makes sense in the con-
text of mobility within and to a lesser extent between municipalities but not
between regions or nations. Further, even within that particular setting, it
relies on quite unrealistic assumptions that have not been empirically vali-
dated. This does not mean that people do not express their discontent with
the pattern of regional fiscal policy by moving to regions they find more
congenial. It implies that this process does not in general yield an efficient
outcome.
4.3.2 Redistribution as a local public good
The traditional fiscal federalism setting implies heterogeneity within regions
and the conventional wisdom is that redistribution should be centralized.
Two main questions can be raised. First, does there exist a central govern-
ment capable of such redistribution? If not, what are the alternative policies?
Second, are there not any arguments in favor of decentralizing redistribu-
tion? We first answer this latter question.
The arguments in favor of giving the central government exclusive re-
sponsibility for redistribution are indeed not clear-cut. Pauly (1973) makes
a case for entrusting regional governments with some redistributive func-
tions. He assumes a particular type of utility interdependencies. The utility
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of the rich is an increasing function of the poor’s income. Further, higher
weight is given to the poor belonging to the region than to those living else-
where. In other words, income redistribution is of the nature of a local public
good. Differences in tastes and incomes may dictate a different amount of
redistribution over regions. In this case, as in the case of any other local
public good, decentralization might be desirable. Pauly considers various
levels of mobility. The case for decentralizing redistribution is stronger the
less mobile are individuals, the more dissimilar are tastes for redistribution
over regions, and the more redistribution it implied by Pareto-efficiency. In
other words, his model seems to fit the European Union more than federal
countries such as the United States.
To sum up, both Tiebout and Pauly provide arguments for letting re-
gional governments achieve their own redistribution, but neither one ad-
dresses the other important issue of redistribution across regions which
clearly calls for some centralization. For Tiebout, equality of income re-
sults from mobility; for Pauly, mobility is limited and redistribution is a
local public good better supplied at the regional level. In a sense, both of
these arguments provide additional support for the idea that competition
between local authorities may have positive effects. In Subsection 3.3 we
have reviewed the arguments that plead in this direction on the basis of rent
seeking behavior on behalf of governments. The arguments presented here
are different for they continue to apply when governments are benevolent.
Instead they point to the idea that competition may be an effective way for
preference revelation in a context of asymmetric information.
4.3.3 Centralization versus cooperation
We now come to the question of whether a central government is capable
of redistribution. In that regard, it is again important to underline the dif-
ferences between a federal setting, such as that of the United States, and a
confederal one, such as the European Union. In a confederation the costs of
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mobility (particularly labor mobility) are higher that in a federation. More
importantly, in the European Union case, there is no real central govern-
ment. In other words, one cannot discuss the issue of centralization versus
decentralization in the same way as in a federal state. Reforms towards ef-
ficiency or equity have to be approached from the viewpoint of negotiation,
cooperation and above all Pareto-improving moves. Welfare improvements
are not sufficient, as the prevailing decision rule is most often unanimity.
Thus the usual debate over centralization versus decentralization is changed
into a debate over Pareto-improvement with and without compensations.
In the perfectly symmetric case, the first-best allocation can easily be
achieved by cooperative agreement. Alternatively, if the central government
imposes some minimum standards of taxation that yield the optimal solu-
tion, these ought to be unanimously agreed upon. Most often, however, there
is no perfect symmetry. Then, it is likely that moving towards the first-best
optimal solution involves different gains across countries or even losses in
some. In this case, compensatory schemes or logrolling procedures have to
be considered. Note however that even in asymmetric cases, some minimum
standards can be Pareto-improving.
Wildasin (1991) examines an economic union within what he calls a com-
mon labor market such as assumed here. He allows for corrective subsidies
by a central government and reaches the striking result that with optimal
subsidies the tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across re-
gions. This implies that regions with weaker preferences for redistribution
should receive larger subsidies. There is however a problem with Wildasin’s
argument. Even if one restricts the corrections of Nash equilibria to Pareto
corrections, they imply side payments. In other words, the optimal scheme
is such that in a two region setting the less redistributive one is compensated
so as to allow for productive efficiency and impose the same tax as the more
redistributive region. Even though such a scheme ought to be unanimously
supported, its actual implementation might be difficult. In a subsequent pa-
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per, Wildasin (1994a) considers a setting with mobile recipients of income
transfers and shows that a region subject to labor immigration may gain by
paying some transfers to workers in the source region so as to reduce the
level of immigration.
Also related to the debate of centralization versus cooperation is the
availability of information for different levels of governments. It is argued
that lower levels authorities (being ”closer” to these tax base) have better
information to implement the tax system, and this is a point in favor of
decentralization. But once again this advantage seems to be different in
federal and confederal systems.20
5 Intergenerational redistribution and tax compe-
tition
Tax competition such as usually approached (and reviewed in the preceding
sections) suggests that countries underprovide public goods and reduce re-
distributive policies. This is because the threat of capital flight and of loss
of skilled labor along with the risk of unskilled labor inflow would prompt
individual countries to set tax rates that are too low from a supranational
welfare perspectives. More recently economists have started investigating
the open economy aspects of intergenerational redistribution and particu-
larly those of pension schemes. This raises interesting questions which go
beyond the scope of the traditional tax competition literature. For example,
there is issue of the co-existence of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and of fully funded
(FF) pension systems within an economic union. Can the co-existence by
sustained ad if yes, what type of adjustements will be induced by economic
integration. These question arises for two reasons. First, the two systems
20The role of asymmetric information between central and local governments has been
discussed over the last decades. The idea that local governments have better knowledge of
needs, preference or resources of individuals that the central government is often advanced
in favor of some decentralization. See on this Bucovetsky et al. (1998), Cremer and
Pestieau (1996a,b), Cremer et al. (1996).
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have different implications in terms of capital accumulation and in autarky
the rate of return on capital will thus tend to differ between countries. Un-
der mobility this will give rise to capital movements which will may have
a significant impact on the individual countries. Second, under a PAYG
system, individuals are effectively born with a debt towards the previous
generation(s). Their contributions will have to pay for the retirement ben-
efits of their (grand) parents. When they are mobile, young workers can,
however, escape from this liability by moving to a country with a FF system.
We shall now briefly discuss some of these problems. There are two
main streams of literature which differ mainly by the underlying source of
mobility: capital only or capital and labor. We start with a setting where
capital the only mobile factor.
5.1 Capital mobility
To illustrate the issue that arise, consider a two-country two-overlapping
generation model.21 In country j = A,B at time t identical consumers
maximize
u
³
cjt , d
j
t+1
´
subject to the budget constraints
cjt = w
j
t − τ t − s
j
t ,
and
djt+1 = s
j
t
³
1 + rjt+1
´
+ pjt+1,
where τ is the payroll tax; p, the pension benefit; c and d, first and sec-
ond period consumption; s, savings; and w and r, wage and interest rate.
Initially both countries are identical but for one aspect, namely the type of
pension system. Country A has a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) pension system.
21We closely follow Casarico (2002).
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Consequently, it offers an implicit rate of return of which equals the rate of
population growth n. The relationship between contributions and benefits
is then given by:
(1 + n) τ t = p
A
t
Country B has a “fully-funded” system so that pension benefits are deter-
mined according to:
¡
1 + rBt+1
¢
τ t = p
B
t+1.
For the sake of simplicity we use a log linear utility function which has the
nice property that consumers spend a fixed proportion, (1− σ) , of lifetime
income on first period consumption and a proportion σ on second period
consumption. Consequently, savings in country A are given by:
sAt = σ
"
wAt − τ
rAt+1 − n
1 + rAt+1
1− σ
σ
#
.
In country B, on the other hand saving is simply
sBt = σ w
B
t .
Production is represented by a CRS production function. In per capita terms,
we have:
yj = f
¡
kj
¢
with yj is output per worker and kj , capital per worker. Assuming perfect
competition, equilibrium factor prices are:
rjt = f
0
³
kjt
´
and wt = ω
³
kjt
´
= f
³
kjt
´
− f 0
³
kjt
´
kjt . (31)
Finally in a closed economy we have the equality between saving and capital
accumulation:
(1 + n) kjt+1 = s
j
t .
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In the steady-state we have
(1 + n) kj = σ
·
ω
¡
kj
¢
− τ jxj f
0 (k)− n
1 + f 0 (k)
1− σ
σ
¸
where xA = 1 and xB = 0. .
Assuming dynamic efficiency, namely rj > n, one obtains:
kA < kB, rA > rB and wA < wB, (32)
as well as, uA < uB. In words, capital stock, wage rate and utility will be
smaller, while the interest rate will be larger in the country with the PAYG
system. These are standard properties which are mainly due to the fact that
with r > n, PAYG offers a lower return than FF.
Let us now introduce perfect capital mobility with the consequence that
both rates of interest must be equal. This quite clearly requires capital flows
from B to A. In the new steady-state, we have kA = kB = kw and thus
equality between interest rates and wages. We use the superscript w for the
perfect capital mobility steady-state solutions. We thus have:
kA < kw < kB ; rB < rw < rA ; wA < ww < wB.
In terms of welfare, outcomes vary between countries and generations. In
country A, future generations are positively affected by capital mobility; in
country B, the effect is ambiguous.
This analysis is of limited scope: it simply shows the incidence of eco-
nomic integration on two countries with different pension system. In terms
of output countries with PAYG seem to gain relative to countries with FF.
In that reasoning we take the basic parameter τ , the payroll tax as given.
Pemberton (1999, 2000) goes one step further. He assumes that a PAYG
system is redistributive and thus generates welfare gains up to a certain limit
for a given capital stock. He then distinguishes two settings. In the first one,
countries are isolated or equivalently, they are integrated but play coopera-
tively. In this setting the optimal choice of τ is made considering its direct
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impact on social welfare (redistribution) and its indirect impact through
capital decrease (production). If we write social welfare in the steady-state
as a function of τ and k, the social planner’s problem is
max
τ
V (τ , k (τ)) ,
which yields
Vτ + Vk
∂k
∂τ
= 0,
with Vτ and Vk positive and ∂k/∂τ < 0.
Let us come to the second setting, that of a small open economy with
given rate of interest and thus, from (31) also given (steady-state per-capita)
capital stock . Put differently, k is no longer a function of τ . The planner’s
problem then becomes
max
τ
V (τ , k)
and the optimal level of taxation is given by Vτ = 0. Consequently, we
obtain a value of τ which is higher than in autarky or in a cooperative
solution. Pemberton (1999) compares the effect of a go-it-alone shift to
FF in a single country with a world-wide shift. He shows that an isolation
paradox may arise: each country may not switch to a FF system because
some of its residents may loose. Yet the switch would be Pareto improving
if all the countries simultaneously switched. The isolation paradox can be
interpreted, once again, as a coordination failure.
5.2 Mobility of labor and capital
We now add the mobility of labor and assume that young workers (and
payroll taxpayers) can choose their country of residence. Mobility of labor
and capital with pensions systems is particularly interesting because it im-
plies two equilibrium conditions that are likely to be incompatible. The first
one is the consequence of capital mobility. Assuming a CRS technology, the
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equality of rate of return on capital leads to the equality of wage across
regions. Using the above notation, one has rA = rB = r and thus
wA = wB = w.
Then, we also have the labor mobility equilibrium which is satisfies:
0 < LA, LB < NA +NB for wA − τA r − n
1 + r
= wB
LA = 0 <
LA = NA +NB >



(33)
where N j is the population of workers in region j before migration and Lj
is the population of workers after migration. Recall that country A has a
PAYG system while pensions are FF in country B.
It is clear from these conditions that to obtain an interior solution we
need τA = 0, so that the PAYG system will have to disappear: taxes are
zero or they are positive and all potential payroll taxpayer leave the country.
Either way, no revenue can be raised to finance the PAYG pensions. For
the young generation this effectively implies a switch to a FF system. Older
individuals, however, and especially those who are already retired when
integration occurs are bound to loose in the process as the financing of their
retirement benefits is jeopardized.
We can easily extend our analysis to the case of two PAYG systems
of possibly different size. When A and B both have PAYG systems the
condition for an interior migration equilibrium is given by
wA − τA r − n
1 + r
= wB − τB r − n
1 + r
,
which in turn requires τA = τB so that contribution rates (and thus benefits)
must be equalized. Otherwise one of the two countries, that with the higher
τ j will be emptied of its young workers, the old retirees being left behind
without pension benefits. Consequently, we have the result by Homburg
and Richter (1993) [see also Breyer and Kolmar (2002)] that harmonization
is necessary on efficiency grounds when households can freely migrate be-
tween regions. To avoid such extreme solutions, a number of authors have
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introduce additional features: differential fertility rates, decreasing returns
to scale, mobility costs, public goods.22
With labor mobility, differentials in the net benefits that individuals
can expect from public pensions [in the above example −τ j (r − n) /(1+ r)]
alter the payoff to migration and can influence the international allocation of
labor. Wildasin (1999) estimates the change in the present value of lifetime
wealth for representative workers in 7 European Union countries that results
from switching from one public pension program to another. He shows that
moving between certain countries can result in an increase of 15% or even
more in lifetime wealth. As he points out, differentials in net benefits create
fiscal incentives for inefficient labor allocation. We expect increased mobility
to lead to a reduction in differences in intergenerational redistribution over
time.
6 Conclusion
In this survey, we have focused on the effect of factor mobility on the capacity
of national governments to redistribute income. As emphasized in most
studies surveyed, mobility makes it difficult to efficiently tax or subsidize
mobile factors, whatever they are, capital or labor. To a certain extent,
the effects of labor and capital mobility are alike, which is a bit surprising.
There are however some differences. First, labor income tax base tends to
be empirically much broader than that of capital income. Second, and more
importantly, the similarity hinges upon the assumption that the national
governments are concerned all the welfare of all mobile nationals regardless
of their location.
Another distinction concerns the possibility of formal or informal dis-
crimination between an incoming factor of production and a long time es-
tablished one. In the case of capital mobility and given the source based
principle, it often happens that foreign capital income is subject to a lower
22See also Jousten and Pestieau (2002).
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tax , if any, than domestic capital income. In the case of labor mobility,
and specifically of low skill labor, the residence based principle applies and
differential tax treatment is hardly conceivable except in the treatment of
illegal migration.
Regardless of these differences, we have seen that in general, factor mo-
bility makes it difficult to conduct the same redistribution policies as would
be conducted in autarky. This is where one thinks of centralization or co-
operation. We have seen that in a number cases the type of equilibrium
with lower redistribution was of the Pareto-inferior type. In other words,
cooperation is feasible. However, in many real-life asymmetrical situations,
the non-cooperative solution is not of that type. Further, besides regional
income redistribution, there is another issue, namely that of redistribution
across regions for which a certain centralized compelling authority is un-
avoidable.
We have also pointed out another possible pitfall of cooperation which
arises because a coordinated setting of all relevant tax instruments may
not be a realistic perspective. A piece-meal approach involving only partial
cooperation (or harmonization) appears to be more reasonable to expect.
But then the welfare impact of the cooperation policy is less straightforward
to assess. For instance, if the EU countries were do agree on minimum tax
rates on capital incomes, this might lead to fiercer tax competition for the
setting of other tax instruments.
Finally, we have briefly reviewed soem recent contributions which go
beyond the scope of the traditional tax competition literature. These pa-
pers study for example, there is issue of the co-existence of PAYG and of
fully funded FF pension systems within an economic union. The question is
wether such a co-existence can be sustained ad if yes, what type of adjuste-
ments will be induced by economic integration.
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